Eastern Front #39 The Kozlov Offensive cover art

Eastern Front #39 The Kozlov Offensive

Eastern Front #39 The Kozlov Offensive

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Last time we spoke about the beginning of the Demyansk Air Bridge. The Soviet 2nd Shock Army captured Krasnaia Gorka, advancing toward Lyuban to potentially relieve Leningrad's siege, where 460,000 had died from starvation since February 1941. The Northwestern Front encircled 95,000 Germans at Demyansk, forcing reliance on a Luftwaffe airlift led by Fritz Morzik. Amid -40°C temperatures, Ju-52 transports delivered minimal supplies. rations were slashed, and horses starved. averting collapse but at high cost. A smaller pocket at Kholm endured Soviet artillery barrages, with defenders sheltering in cellars; airdrops sustained them despite heavy casualties. In the center, Zhukov's forces faced Model's counterattacks near Rzhev-Vyazma. The 29th Army's encirclement ended in disaster, with thousands captured. Ambitious Soviet plans to destroy Army Group Center by March 5th proved unrealistic amid tank shortages. Further south, von Bock stalled Timoshenko, and Crimea deadlocked. This episode is The start of the Kozlov Offensive Well hello there, welcome to the Eastern Front week by week podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. As the month of February approaches its conclusion, STAVKA becomes aware that it is engaged in a competition against time. The arrival of the Spring Rasputitsa looms threateningly. The broad offensive has made significant territorial gains but has not secured substantial strategic triumphs. On February 23rd, the Commissariat of Defence issued instructions for preparing operations for the Spring and Summer periods. The directive emphasized that it would be "unforgivably myopic" to be satisfied with the present accomplishments and assume the Germans are defeated. One potential accomplishment appears to be emerging for the Volkhov Front, with forces advancing to within 5km of Lyuban by February 25th. However, a counteroffensive by three German infantry divisions struck their side. The Germans reclaimed Krasnaia Gorka on February 27th. Two Soviet divisions found themselves surrounded at Riabovo. Although most of these soldiers would ultimately slip away in small units back to Soviet positions, 6,000 would still be taken prisoner by the time the encirclement was fully eliminated on March 15th. Becoming more irritated by the setbacks of the Volkhov Front, Stalin issued several orders on February 26th calling for additional offensives from both the Leningrad and Volkhov Fronts. Both fronts were required to eradicate all German forces at Lyuban and Chudovo by March 5th. Stalin also endorsed the strategies to reorganize and replenish the 2nd Army but demanded that it persist in its assault toward Lyuban without interruptions. Additionally, Voroshilov and Malenkov were sent to Meretskov’s command center to supervise activities. Scholars believe Malenkov was assigned to identify individuals to blame for the offensive's shortcomings thus far and for any forthcoming failures. One of Malenkov's initial actions was to dismiss the majority of the 2nd Army's leadership team. As per Glantz, “[Stavka directive no. 170134 to the Volkhov Front commander about cadre changes in the 2nd Shock Army] The directive removed Major General Vizzhilin for 'poor work as chief of staff' and replaced him with Colonel Rozhdestvensky, the former chief of staff of the 52nd Army. The same order replaced the chief of the 2nd Shock Army's operations department [Colonel Pakhomov] for 'poor work and false information.' Major General Petr Fedorovich Alferev was assigned to be the Army’s Deputy by Stalin." This occurred following his inspection, along with Meretskov, of the 2nd Shock Army’s headquarters, in addition to evaluating the combat near Krasnaia Gorka. There, they discovered deficiencies in ammunition, absence of aerial protection, and inadequate management of reinforcements. They also noted that the Army’s documentation of casualties was in complete disarray. Beyond the extensive alterations to the 2nd Army’s personnel, Meretskov would send his Front’s Artillery and Tank leaders to the 2nd Shock Army to provide guidance on its operations. Malenkov would further designate the rising officer Vlasov as Meretskov’s Deputy. Then, on February 28th, Stalin required Voroshilov, Meretskov, and Khozin to formulate a fresh...
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